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Abstract 
 
This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study 
how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' 
effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the 
decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV 
management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We 
find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger 
profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range 
of self-enforceable JV agreements. 
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1 Introduction
JVs are contracts whereby firms decide to jointly invest in order to improve their
individual competitiveness. In the last two decades this kind of cooperation
significantly increased, specially for R&D and International Joint Ventures.1
The main motivation of this success is the jointly exploitation of partners’ skills.
Research Joint ventures (RJV) allow to internalize R&D spillover effects and also
to save on R&D costs.2 International Joint Ventures are used by multinational
enterprises (MNE) to enter developing countries markets, whereas local partners
can access new technologies and know-how. Also governments and institutions
fostered the formation of JVs by creating programmes and subsidies. Think, for
example, of the NCRA act and its amendments in U.S.3 or the JEV programme
in EU.4 Unfortunately, JV agreements are not easy to enforce not only because of
the moral hazard problems among partners,5 but also because of their different
capacity to contribute to the creation of the JV. That is why MNEs decide to
form a JV only when they find local partners able to positively contribute to the
JV profits or why the promotion of JVs through institutional programs can fail.
From this point of view, investigating on the asymmetric partners contribution
together with moral hazard problems can explain, at least partially, why MNE
prefers to create JV in some countries rather than in others or why EU programs
like JOP and ECIP failed in their objectives whereas the JEV program is still
operating.6
The study of how partners’ asymmetry affects the creation and the profit
sharing of JVs has already been covered in the literature. Veugelers and Kesteloot
[18] analyze the creation of a Research Joint Venture when partners have a dif-
1“The incidence of joint ventures is increasing especially in sectors where innovation costs
and/or competition are increasing” OECD [17].
2The most influential paper in the literature concerning the internalization of R&D
spillovers is undoubtedly d’Aspremont-Jacquemin [3]. See also Caloghirou et al. [7] and
Hagerdoon et al. [11] for a survey on research partnerships.
3The National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) was approved in 1986 to boost R&D
cooperation among U.S. firms. Basically, it weakened some antitrust rules for all the firms
willing to create Research Joint Ventures. During the first half of the ’90, it was extended
also to other forms of JVs.
4The JEV (Joint European Ventures) program offers a financial support (max 100.000
Euros) to all EU firms that want to create a JV with the condition that they should not
belong to the same country.
5As pointed out by Nakamura and Yeung [16]: “When the supplying of effort is not readily
observable, a supplying parent has the incentive and the opportunity to undersupply its effort”.
6“JOP Programme” aimed to promote the creation of JV between EU firms with others
from the ex-soviet block. ECIP was built to foster the cooperation among EU firms with
Latin-American ones. Both programs have been suppressed in 1999 because of their negligible
results.
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ferent R&D efficiency and/ or absorptive capacity. What they find is that RJV
are less stable when the absorptive capacity is low and/or the R&D efficiency
of a partner is sufficiently high. On the other hand, Belleflamme and Bloch [5]
study the creation of a JV when partners have different production efficiency
and operate in complementary/substitute market structures. They show that
a more efficient partner should have a larger share of the JV profits. Paying
attention to International Joint Ventures, Lin and Saggi [13] try to understand
how the ownership structure affects the incentive of a more productive partner
(i.e. MNE) to upgrade its input for the JV production. They also see whether
upgrading an input could affect the JV ownership structure. Their main finding
is that, when the JV profit shares are imposed by local governments, a MNE
has lower incentives to upgrade its input. According to this result, they also
suggest that JV profits are maximized when the most productive firm has a
larger share.
We propose a model where the partners’ efforts have a different impact on
JV profits. We first study how such asymmetry influences the creation and
the ownership structure when partners’ investments are not observable. Then,
we see whether a JV agreement is easier to enforce when the decision on JV
profit sharing is delegated to the independent JV management (Management
Sharing) rather than being jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). To
the best of our knowledge, the relevance of this last question is not yet faced in
the literature.7 Our study suggests three interesting results.
First, similarly to Belleflamme and Bloch [5] and Lin and Saggi [13], we
find that the firm whose effort has a highest impact on JV profits should have
a larger profit shares. Furthermore, such firm gets a lower share under “Co-
ordinated sharing” than in the case of “Management sharing”. This because
in the latter sharing rule the management set the shares also taking into ac-
count the complementarity degree of the partners’ investment. Finally, we show
that Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-
enforceable JV agreements so that it can be an alternative sharing rule to create
a JV whenever Coordinated sharing is not enforceable.
It is worth to mention that we also base our model on one of the most impor-
tant criticisms made by some business scholars to the residual rights approach:8
7In their hidden information problem, Darrough and Stoughton [8] solve their profit sharing
scheme using the JV management as ruler. However, they do not consider the case where
partners jointly decide the optimal shares.
8In particular, according to Grossman and Hart [10] and Hart and Moore [12] seminal
papers, JV agreements should be considered as an “incomplete contracts” problem where the
optimal ownership share (i.e. the profit share and the control of the JV) should be assesed
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the ownership structure may reflect the relevance of partners contribution to
the JV.9 Furthermore, since this criticism has been validated only with empiri-
cal studies,10 our work can be also seen as a first attempt to give a theoretical
background to such point of view.
In the next section we introduce some basic hypotheses of the model whereas
in Section 3 we analyze the JV agreement when partners’effort is observable.
Then we find the optimal JV profit shares when the decision is either coordinated
among partners (Section 4) or delegated to the JV management (Section 5). In
section 6 we compare these optimal shares looking at the self-enforceability of
the JV agreement. Some concluding remarks are left in the last section.
2 Model
In the rest of the paper, the following assumptions hold.
Profitability Assume that two firms i = 1, 2 want to create an independent
JV in order to develop a new product. With linear investment costs, the total
net benefit from the cooperation is
piJV (a1, a2, ε)− a1 − a2 ≥ 0
where piJV (a1, a2, ε) is the Joint Venture profit, ai > 0 is the amount invested
by firm i and ε is a random shock distributed with zero mean and variance σ2.
Since the performance of the JV is uncertain, the partners decision of creating
it, as well as their strategies, will be taken according to the expected JV profits
ΠJV (a1, a2). Consequently, a JV will be created only when
ΠJV (a1, a2)− a1 − a2 ≥ 0
Moreover, the existence of a random shock implies that, whenever the effort is
not observable, each parental firm cannot distinguish whether a bad performance
of the JV is due either to a defection of the other partner or to the random shock.
according to the attribution of the so called “residual rights”.
9Makino and Beamish [14] summarized such criticisms finding four main limits to the
“residual rights” approach: 1) control can be exercised through non-ownership mechanisms;
2) even with a larger ownership, a partner could be not able to control the JV operation;
3) the minority partner could have a dominant control of a specific activity in the JV 4) the
ownership position may also represent the relative importance of partner contributions to the
JV.
10For example, using a U.S. database, Blodgett [6] shows that partners with higher con-
tribution in technology and know-how usually gets a higher share than firms who contribute
to the JV with commercial or logistic support. See Makino and Beamish [14] for further
references.
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Strict Complementarity Partners’ investments are strong complements,
namely, the JV profit function is increasing and strictly concave with respect to
the invested assets
∂2ΠJV (a1,a2)
∂a1∂a2
> 0 ∂
2ΠJV (a1,a2)
∂a21
< 0 detHJV > 0
where HJV is the Hessian matrix of ΠJV .11 Such assumption is quite common
in the literature12 and reasonable if we think that firms create Joint Ventures
in order to benefit from synergies among their skills. A simple way to represent
such strict complementarity is to consider the following JV profit structure
ΠJV (a1, a2) = ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
with α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1). For the sake of simplicity, we will replace ΠJV (aα11 aα22 )
with ΠJV (a) whenever the notation becomes too cumbersome.
No side payments Furthermore, side payments are not allowed between
partners. We make this assumption because direct transfers are in general more
usual when JV’s are not new legal entities as supposed in our case.13 Moreover,
as pointed out by Asiedu and Esfahani [2], in International Joint Ventures side
payments could be forbidden by local governments in order to retain more rents
in the country.14
Sharing schemes and timing In the paper we consider two possible JV
profit sharing schemes. In the first one, called Coordinated Sharing, parent firms
first jointly decide their JV profit shares (s, 1 − s) in order to maximize their
cooperative profits. In the second, called Management Sharing, the decision
about the JV profit shares is immediately delegated to the independent JV
management whose objective is to maximize the JV profits. The timing of the
model can be summarized as follows
11An alternative way to define strong complementarity requires that investments of both
firms are necessary to have strictly positive profits. Formally
ΠJV (a1, 0) = ΠJV (0, a2) = 0
12See for example Anbarci et al. [1] for Research Joint Ventures.
13Think for example to the typical Research Joint Venture where a large pharmaceutical
firm funds a small biotech one to develop new technologies, products etc. See also Freshfield
Bruckhaus Deringer [9] for a legal point of view.
14Another reason to reject the direct transfers assumption is suggested by Nakamura [15]:
side payments in the context of international Joint Ventures correspond to the contractible
aspects of the use of intangible assets (i.e. technology and name brand) which are usually
contracted away from the agreement in the form of royalties and/or lump-sum payments.
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1. each firm has to decide whether or not to participate to the JV;
2. if both firms want to create the JV, then they have to choose either Co-
ordinated or Management sharing as a JV profit sharing rule;
3. the JV profits shares (s, 1 − s) are therefore set according to the sharing
rule chosen by the partners;
4. once these shares are defined, each firm invests an amount of assets ai(s) >
0 in order to make the JV operative;
5. the direction of the JV is then delegated to the independent management
who maximizes the JV profits.
To avoid useless complications there are no moral hazard problems between
partners and management: the effort of the latter is always perfectly observable.
In the next section, we analyze the Coordinated Sharing scheme when the
partners’ effort is perfectly observable. The Management Sharing will be not
considered because, under perfect observability, partners can always define a
self-enforceable JV contract without using an alternative sharing decisioner.
3 Coordinated Sharing with perfect observabil-
ity
In the Coordinated Sharing, parental firms jointly choose the profit shares
(s, 1− s) such that, fostering the optimal effort levels, partners maximize their
cooperative profits ΠC . Of course, each firm has the incentive to ask for a higher
share but reducing too much the share of the other firm would induce a reduc-
tion of its effort. Given this trade-off and assuming the perfect observability of
partners effort, the problem faced by the parental firms is
maxs ΠC = ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )− a1 − a2
s.t.
s ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )− a1 ≥ 0 IR1
(1− s) ΠJV (aα11 aα22 )− a2 ≥ 0 IR2
where IR1 and IR2 are the individual rationality constraints of firm 1 and 2
respectively. Since the marginal benefits for firm i to invest ai in the JV is
∂ΠC
∂ai
=
αi a
αj
j Π
′
JV (a)
a1−αii
− 1
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the solution is interior and unique because the following conditions
∂ΠC
∂ai
∣∣∣
ai→0
> 0 ; ∂ΠC∂ai
∣∣∣
ai→∞
< 0
are always satisfied for each ai > 0. On the other side, we can rewrite the two
IR constraints as a function of s
a1
ΠJV (a)
≤ s ≤ 1− a2
ΠJV (a)
(1)
so that they are satisfied only when s is in the above interval range. Finally,
in order to find the optimal investment strategy we can use the following first
order conditions of ΠC
∂ΠC
∂a1
= α1 aα1−11 a
α2
2 Π
′
JV (a)− 1 = 0 (2)
∂ΠC
∂a2
= α2 aα11 a
α2−1
2 Π
′
JV (a)− 1 = 0
⇒ a2 = α2
α1
a1
which show that there is a non-symmetric equilibrium whenever partners effort
has a different impact on JV profits (i.e. αi 6= αj). For example, for α1 > α2,
firm 1 has a higher “impact” on ΠJV and it should invest more than firm 2
to maximize ΠC . Moreover, another important feature is that a higher impact
of firm 1 effort makes IR1 constraint more difficult to satisfy. In the next two
sections we study the Coordinated and Management sharing schemes when the
effort of parental firms is not observable.
4 Coordinated Sharing with non observable ef-
forts
In the case of Coordinated Sharing and non observable efforts, parental firms
face a doubled-sided moral hazard problem. As principal, each firm wants to
maximize the effort of the other. As agent, each partner has an incentive to
free-ride by reducing its own effort because it cannot be punished insofar as
the performance of the JV depends also on a random shock. Consequently, the
only second-best solution comes out when the cooperative profits are maximized
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according to the incentive constraints of each partner (IC1 and IC2)
maxs ΠC = ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )− a1 − a2
s.t.
a1 ∈ argmax ΠJV,1 = s ΠJV (aα11 aα22 )− a1 IC1
a2 ∈ argmax ΠJV,2 = (1− s) ΠJV (aα11 aα22 )− a2 IC2
+ IR1
+ IR2
Where ΠJV,i is the payoff of firm i when it participates to the JV. As sug-
gested by Belleflamme and Bloch [5], such problem can be solved by totally
differentiating ΠC with respect to s
dΠC
ds
=
∂ΠC
∂a1
∂a1
∂s
+
∂ΠC
∂a2
∂a2
∂s
(3)
In fact, knowing that firms’ investment strategies depend on the JV profit shares,
this condition allows us to study when an increase of s has a positive effect on the
objective function: whenever dΠCds > 0, a further increase of s is more desirable
because it ensures higher cooperative profits. The opposite obviously occurs for
dΠC
ds < 0.
To define the optimal share, a first step is to use the partners’ implicit
reaction function (obtained from the incentive constraints)
∂ΠJV,1
∂a1
= 0⇔ s ∂ΠJV (a
α1
1 a
α2
2 )
∂a1
− 1 = 0 (4)
∂ΠJV,2
∂a2
= 0⇔ (1− s) ∂ΠJV (a
α1
1 a
α2
2 )
∂a2
− 1 = 0
to rewrite the partial effect of the investments on the cooperative profits as
follows
∂ΠC
∂a1
= (1− s) ΠJV (a
α1
1 a
α2
2 )
∂a1
+ s
ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
∂a1
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
⇒
∂ΠC
∂a1
= (1− s) ΠJV (a
α1
1 a
α2
2 )
∂a1
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∂ΠC
∂a2
= s
ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
∂a2
+ (1− s) ΠJV (a
α1
1 a
α2
2 )
∂a2
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
⇒
∂ΠC
∂a2
= s
ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
∂a2
so that the total differential becomes
dΠC
ds
= (1− s) ∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
∂a1
∂s
+ s
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
∂a2
∂s
(5)
The second step is to explicit the partial effects of s on ai. For this purpose, we
totally differentiate the incentive constraints of parental firms with respect to s
and get a system of two equations
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
+ s
(
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
∂a1
∂s +
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂a2
∂s
)
= 0
−∂ΠJV (a)∂a2 + (1− s)
(
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂a1
∂s +
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
∂a2
∂s
)
= 0
whose unknowns are the partial effects of s on partners effort ai. After some
calculations,15 the following solutions allow us to see how partners modify their
optimal investments as s changes16
∂a1
∂s
= −
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
+ (1− s) ∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
s (1− s) detHJV
∂a2
∂s
=
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
+ (1− s) ∂2ΠJV (a)∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
s (1− s) detHJV
Substituting these values into Equation (3) and rearranging some terms it is
possible to find the following condition
dΠC
ds ≥ 0⇔ s2
[
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
)2
− ∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2]
−(1− 2s)∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2
≥ 0
(6)
which can be explicited according to our JV profits function as
dΠC
ds
≥ 0⇔ s2Π′JV (a)(α1 − α2)− (1− 2s)α1 (7)
·
[
(α2 − 1)Π′JV (a) + α2aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
≥ 0
15See Appendix A for further details.
16Note that when it is near to zero, an increase of s stimulates firm 1 to increase its effort
because she can increase further its payoff. The opposite occurs as s approaches one.
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As it can be seen, when the firms’ investments have a symmetric impact on JV
profits (i.e. α1 = α2) the optimal share is s∗C = 1/2. On the other hand, in the
asymetric case we cannot calculate s∗C without specifying the expected Joint
Venture profit function ΠJV (a). This is of course a drawback of our method.17
However, we can see when s∗C is larger than 1/2 by simply studying the sign of
equation (7) at s = 1/2
dΠC
ds
≥ 0
∣∣∣∣
s=1/2
⇔ α1 ≥ α2 (8)
which allows us to state the following
Proposition 1 In a JV agreement where firms jointly decide their profit shares,
the firm whose investments have a larger impact on the JV profits must have a
larger share.
5 Management Sharing
In the case of Management sharing, parent firms delegate the sharing decision
to the independent management. Since it is paid to maximize the JV profit,
the management must take into account that its sharing decision influences the
partners’ effort and, consequently, the expected performance of the JV itself.
Thereby, when the partners’ effort is not observable, the problem faced by the
management is18
maxs ΠM = ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
s.t.
a1 ∈ argmax ΠJV,1 = s ΠJV (aα11 aα22 )− a1 IC1
a2 ∈ argmax ΠJV,2 = (1− s) ΠJV (aα11 aα22 )− a2 IC2
+ IR1
+ IR2
17Later on, we propose an example where we specify a JV profit function in order to un-
derstand how it is possible to find an optimal ownership share s∗C .
18The problem actually reflects a principal multi-agent problem. However, since the objec-
tive function is also included in the incentive constraints, we will adopt the same approach as
in the previous case.
10
Firstly, since the objective function corresponds to the JV profit function, it
is increasing and strict concave so that the following conditions for a unique
non-trivial solution
∂ΠM
∂ai
∣∣∣
ai→0
> 0 ; ∂ΠM∂ai
∣∣∣
ai→∞
< 0
are always satisfied.
Secondly, as in the previous section, the optimal ownership scheme comes out
by totally differentiating the objective function
dΠM
ds
=
∂ΠM
∂a1
∂a1
∂s
+
∂ΠM
∂a2
∂a2
∂s
(9)
In this case, the partial effect of partners’ efforts on the JV profit are
∂ΠM
∂a1
=
∂ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
∂a1
;
∂ΠM
∂a2
=
∂ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
∂a2
whereas the partial effects of s over partners’ effort are the same as in Coordi-
nated sharing because the incentive constraints do not change
∂a1
∂s
= −
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
+ (1− s) ∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
s (1− s) detHJV
∂a2
∂s
=
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
+ (1− s) ∂2ΠJV (a)∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
s (1− s) detHJV
Using these partial derivatives we can define the total effect of s on ΠM as19
dΠM
ds ≥ 0⇔ s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
)2
− (1− s)∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2
+(1− 2s)∂2ΠJV (a)∂a1a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
≥ 0
(10)
Substituting our JV profit function, we find after some calculations (see Ap-
pendix B) the following optimal sharing scheme
dΠM
ds
= 0⇔ s∗M =
α1
α1 + α2
(11)
which allows us to state the following
Proposition 2 In a JV agreement where JV management decides on the JV
profit shares, the firm whose investments have a larger impact on the JV profits
must have a larger share.
Note first that, like in Coordinated sharing, partners get the same share if their
efforts have a symmetric effect on JV profit. However, the optimal share s∗M
does not depend on the JV profit structure. Moreover, the last term in the
equation (10) shows that the Management sharing decision is based also on the
partners’ effort complementarity.
19See Appendix B for a formal proof.
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6 Coordinated vs. Management sharing
Making a comparison between Coordinated and Management sharing, both
schemes suggest that the firm with a larger contribution capacity should have
a higher JV profit share. Yet, we are unable to assess either which of them
gives a higher share to the firm with the highest impact or which is the most
enforceable sharing rule.
Optimal shares Concerning the first issue, suppose that firm 1 has larger
impact on JV profits without loss of generality (i.e. α1 > α2). Given that
the JV profit function is increasing and strictly concave, a simple way to check
which sharing scheme ensures a higher share is to see the sign of equation (7)
at s = s∗M . A positive value would mean that s
∗
M is suboptimal to maximize
joint profits (i.e. s∗C > s
∗
M ) whereas, a negative one, would imply that firm 1’s
share is too high (i.e. s∗C < s
∗
M ). Substituting s
∗
M =
α1
α1+α2
in equation (7) we
get the following condition
dΠC
ds
≥ 0
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗M
⇔ Π′JV (a)(1− α1 − α2)− (α1 + α2)aΠ
′′
JV (a) ≤ 0 (12)
which is incompatible with a concavity condition of the JV profit function
Proposition 3 In a JV where firm i’s effort has a larger impact on JV profits,
firm i gets a higher share in the “Management sharing” than in the “Coordinated
sharing”.
Proof: Comparing the equation (12) with a concavity condition of the JV profit
function
detHJV > 0⇔ Π′JV (a) (1− α1 − α2)− (α1 + α2) a Π
′′
JV (a) > 0
we can see they are incompatible. Q.E.D.
Enforceability Looking at the enforceability of the JV contract, namely the
satisfaction of IR constraints,
a1
ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
≤ s ≤ 1− a2
ΠJV (aα11 a
α2
2 )
Management sharing should lead to a wider range of self enforceable contracts
because it maximizes JV profits. On the other hand, since Management shar-
ing also leads to different JV profit shares, partners’ efforts a1 and a2 will be
different too. The analysis on the enforceability of the JV agreement should
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be consequently done on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, whenever Manage-
ment sharing allows an easier enforceability, the JV agreement can be enforced
only through this sharing scheme. In the following example we show that such
situation is not so uncommon as it seems at first sight.
6.1 An Example
Let the JV be a monopolist in a market with a linear demand p(qJV ) = A−qJV
and a linear cost function which is increasing with respect to c > 0, decreasing
with respect to a = aα11 a
α2
2 , and affected by a random shock ε with zero mean
and finite variance σ2. For example
piJV = (A− qJV )qJV − [A− 2
√
a+ ε− c]qJV
Note that the square root has a positive argument only when a+ ε ≥ c. More-
over, the marginal cost is positive if and only if a+ ε ≤ c+A2/4. Consequently,
in order to have a non-trivial solution we must require that
c ≤ a+ ε ≤ c+ A
2
4
Using the FOC we can find the following optimal quantity and the related JV
profits
q∗JV = (a+ ε− c)1/2 ;pi∗JV = a+ ε− c
Given that partners must assess their decision according to the expected JV
profits then
ΠJV (a) = E(pi∗JV ) = a− c
so that Π
′
JV (a) = 1 and Π
′′
JV (a) = 0. Moreover, in order to have ΠJV (a) strictly
concave we must assume that α1 + α2 < 1.
Optimal Shares According to these values, we can use equation (7) to find
the optimal Coordinated share
s∗C =
α1(1− α2)−
√
α1 α2(α1 − 1) (α2 − 1)
α1 − α2 ; α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1)
which will be higher (lower) than one half when α1 is bigger (smaller) than
α2.20 As shown in figures 1 and 2, an increase of α1 corresponds to an increase
of the share given to firm 1 while the opposite occurs for α2 increasing. On
20Note that s∗ is always positive because both numerator and denominator are positive
whenever α1 > α2 and negative otherwise. However, the s∗C expressed here is valid for
α1 6= α2. For α1 = α2, we must use equation (7) to find that the optimal ownership is always
equal to one half.
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Figure 1: Partial effect of α1 on s∗C with α2 = 0.1
Figure 2: Partial effect of α2 on s∗C with α1 = 0.1
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the opposite, the optimal Management share is
s∗M =
α1
α1 + α2
Before discussing the enforceability of the JV, some remarks are needed. First,
since the notation is no more cumbersome, in the following we point out that
a1, a2 and a = aα11 a
α2
2 depend on s. Second, recall that Management sharing a)
gives higher shares to the firm with the highest impact on JV profits (i.e. s∗M >
s∗C) and b) produce higher (expected) JV profits than Coordinated sharing,
namely ΠJV (a(s∗M )) > ΠJV (a(s
∗
C)). Finally, in our case, we can rewrite the
partners implicit reaction functions (see equation (4)) as
a1(s∗) = s∗ α1 a(s∗) ; a2(s∗) = (1− s∗) α2 a(s∗)
where s∗ can be either s∗M or s
∗
C .
Enforceability Let start from the IR constraints
a1(s)
a(s)− c ≤ s ≤ 1−
a2(s)
a(s)− c
we can rewrite IR1 as
a1(s)
a(s)− c ≤ s⇒ c s ≤ a(s) s − a1(s)
As previouly remarked, in equilibrium a1(s∗) = s∗ α1 a(s∗) so that IR1 be-
comes
c ≤ (1− α1) a(s∗)
In the same way we can rewrite IR2 as21
c ≤ (1− α2) a(s∗)
Consequently, both IR constraints will be satisfied whenever
c ≤ min[(1− α1) a(s∗) ; (1− α2) a(s∗)]
that is when the JV is not too much costly with respect to the expected benefits
(recall that ΠJV (a) = a(s∗)).22 Furthermore, since α1 > α2 , the IR constraints
21In particular
s ≤ 1− a2(s)
a(s)− c ⇒ c ≤ a(s)−
a2(s)
(1− s)
Since according to firm 2 best response function as∗ (s∗) = (1− s∗) α2 a∗, we get our result.
22Note also that, like in the case of perfect effort observability, as firm i has a higher impact
on JV profits by a higher αi, its IR constraint is more difficult to satisfy.
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in the Coordinated and Management sharing schemes are respectively fullfilled
when
c ≤ (1− α1) a(s∗C) ; c ≤ (1− α1) a(s∗M )
which show that the latter scheme ensures a wider range of self enforceable
contracts than the former. In particular, whenever
(1− α1) a(s∗C) ≤ c ≤ (1− α1) a(s∗M )
Management sharing makes the JV agreement self enforceable while Coordi-
nated sharing not. Thereby, even though partners will prefer Coordinated shar-
ing because it lead to higher expected profits, there are some cases where they
can enforce the JV agreement by only using a Management sharing rule.
Proposition 4 In some cases a JV agreement is self-enforceable only by adopt-
ing a Management sharing scheme.
A note about the sharing rule decision Before the concluding remarks,
it is worth to mention the existence of a possible disagreement in the choice
of the sharing rule.23 Since Proposition 3 states that s∗M > s
∗
C , then firm 1
can get higher individual profits from Management sharing even though this
leads to lower joint cooperative profits. This implies that, whenever the two
rules are enforceable, firm 1 can desire Management sharing whereas firm 2
prefers Coordinated sharing. Such disagreement cannot be explained by using
our model.24 However, since we assume that firms want to define at least a
cooperative objective function, such problem is left for further research.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our paper faces two questions on the enforceability of the JV agreements when
partners’ effort is not observable. First, we study how a different impact of part-
ners’ efforts influence the JV profits sharing among the two firms. Afterwards,
we see whether a JV agreement can be easier to enforce when the decision on
JV profit sharing is delegated to the independent JV management rather than
being jointly taken by partners.
23Many thanks to Gilles Grandjean to point out this drawback of the model.
24We can imagine that such disagreement lead to a) the failure of the JV creation b) a
bargaining procedure which lead to one of the two sharing rules c) the default choice for
Coordinated sharing insofar as it is the most common way to define a cooperative agreement
(think for example to Cartels or Research Joint Ventures where participants maximize their
joint profits).
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First of all, we find both Coordinated and Management sharing suggesting
that the firm whose effort has the highest impact on JV profits should have
a larger share. This result is in line with the ones by Belleflamme and Bloch
[5] and Lin and Saggi [13] and, since it is based on the different impact of
partners effort on JV profit, it gives also a theoretical background to one the
most important criticism to the “residual rights” literature.
Our second result is that in some cases a Management sharing can make the
JV agreement easier to enforce. Hence, it can be considered a valid alternative
rule whenever the JV is not enforceable under a more usual Coordinated sharing.
In this way a firm, who can weakly contributes to a JV, is more able to attract
a “stronger” partner. On the other hand, governments and institutions can
use Management sharing to improve their programs in favor of the cooperation
among firms. Even more interestingly, government of developing countries can
promote Management sharing rather than imposing suboptimal profit shares
which deter multinational enterprises to invest in their nations.
Limits and Extensions Even though interesting, the model has still some
limits to take into account. The first one is rather a suggestion for a possible
extension. Our results are in fact proved for Joint Ventures with only two
partners; however, it would be more interesting if they also hold for JVs with
more than two partners. Another drawback of the model is that the optimal
Coordinated share cannot be defined unless the JV profit function is specified.
Moreover, as already said in the last section, further investigation should be
made when partners disagree on the sharing rule to adopt when more than one
rule can be enforced. Finally, we assume that the JV management is perfectly
observable and independent at the same time. However, a strict control on the
management activity can sometimes imply that it is not fully independent to
operate as it will.
A Coordinated Sharing
Let start from equation (5)
dΠC
ds
= (1− s) ∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
∂a1
partials
+ s
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
∂a2
∂s
In order to find the optimal share we explicit the partial effects of s on ai by
totally differentiating the incentive constraints of parental firms with respect to
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s. In this way we can see how these firms modify their investments as s changes
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
+ s
(
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
∂a1
∂s +
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂a2
∂s
)
= 0
−∂ΠJV (a)∂a2 + (1− s)
(
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂a1
∂s +
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
∂a2
∂s
)
= 0
Rearranging some terms we get a system of two equations and two unkowns
s
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a21︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
∂a1
∂s + s
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
∂a2
∂s +
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
= 0
(1− s) ∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
∂a1
∂s + (1− s)
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
∂a2
∂s −
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
= 0
whose solutions are25
∂a1
∂s
= −BF +DE
AD −BC =
= −
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
+ (1− s) ∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
s (1− s) detHJV
∂a2
∂s
=
AF + CE
AD −BC =
=
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
+ (1− s) ∂2ΠJV (a)∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
s (1− s) detHJV
Now, using the capital letter notation we can rewrite the total differential as
dΠC
ds
= (1− s) E
(
−BF +DE
AD −BC
)
+ s F
AF + CE
AD −BC (13)
Observing that (1− s)BEF = sCEF , the total differential becomes
dΠC
ds
=
sAF 2 − (1− s)DE2
AD −BC =
=
s2 ∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
)2
− (1− s)2 ∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2
s(1− s)det(HJV )
We can ignore the denominator because it is always positive. Rearranging some
terms of the numerator we find the following condition
dΠC
ds ≥ 0⇔ s2
[
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
)2
− ∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2]
−(1− 2s)∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2
≥ 0
25Recall that detHJV is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the JV profits.
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which corresponds to our equation (6). Simple calculations show that
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a2i
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂aj
)2
= αiα2ja
3αi−2
i a
3αj−2
j
(
Π
′
JV (a)
)2
·
·
[
(αi − 1)Π′JV (a) + αiaΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
Hence equation (6) can be rewritten as
dΠC
ds
≥ 0⇔
α1α2a
3α1−2
1 a
3α2−2
2
(
Π
′
JV (a)
)2 {
s2Π
′
JV (a)(α1 − α2)
−(1− 2s)α1
[
(α2 − 1)Π′JV (a) + α2aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]}
≥ 0
Since all the terms outside the brackets are strictly positive the condition reduces
to
dΠC
ds
≥ 0⇔ s2Π′JV (a)(α1 − α2)− (1− 2s)α1·
·
[
(α2 − 1)Π′JV (a) + α2aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
≥ 0
Which corresponds to our equation (7). Q.E.D
B Management Sharing
In this section we want to explicit the following total differential
dΠM
ds
=
∂ΠM
∂a1
∂a1
∂s
+
∂ΠM
∂a2
∂a2
∂s
As already pointed out, ∂ΠM∂ai =
∂ΠJV
∂ai
whereas ∂ai∂s is the same as in Coordinated
sharing because the incentive constraints do not change. Consequently, we can
rewrite coeteris paribus these partial effects using the same notation of the
previous section with the only difference that now
∂ΠM
∂a1
=
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
= E ;
∂ΠM
∂a2
=
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
= F
In this way the total differential becomes
dΠM
ds
= E
(
−BF +DE
AD −BC
)
+ F
(
AF + CE
AD −BC
)
=
=
AF 2 −DE2 + CEF −BEF
AD −BC
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Substituting the related partial derivatives we get
dΠM
ds
=
s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
)2
− (1− s)∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2
+
s(1− s)det(HJV )
+(1− 2s)∂2ΠJV (a)∂a1∂a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
s(1− s)det(HJV )
Since the denominator is always positive, the total effect of s on ΠM is
dΠM
ds ≥ 0⇔ s∂
2ΠJV (a)
∂a21
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
)2
− (1− s)∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a22
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
)2
+(1− 2s)∂2ΠJV (a)∂a1a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a1
∂ΠJV (a)
∂a2
which corresponds to equation (10). Given that
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a2i
(
∂ΠJV (a)
∂aj
)2
=
= αiα2ja
3αi−2
i a
3αj−2
j
(
Π
′
JV (a)
)2 [
(αi − 1)Π′JV (a) + αiaΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
whereas
∂2ΠJV (a)
∂a1a2
∂ΠJV (a)
∂ai
∂ΠJV (a)
∂aj
=
= (α1α2)2a3α1−21 a
3α2−2
2
(
Π
′
JV (a)
)2 [
Π
′
JV (a) + aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
We can simplify the equation (10) as
dΠM
ds
≥ 0⇔ α1α2 a3α1−21 a3α2−2j
(
Π
′
JV (a)
)2
·
·
{
sα2
[
(α1 − 1)Π′JV (a) + α1aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
+
−(1− s)α1
[
(α2 − 1)Π′JV (a) + α2aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]
+(1− 2s)α1α2
[
Π
′
JV (a) + aΠ
′′
JV (a)
]}
≥ 0
All the terms outside the brackets are always positive, so they can be ignored.
Expliciting all the terms inside brackets we get
dΠM
ds
≥ 0⇔
[
sα2(α1 − 1)Π′JV (a) + sα1α2 a Π
′′
JV (a)
−(1− s)α1(α2 − 1)Π′JV (a)− (1− s)α1α2 a Π
′′
JV (a)
+(1− 2s)α1α2Π′JV (a) + (1− 2s)Π
′′
JV (a)
]
≥ 0
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so that
dΠM
ds
≥ 0⇔
[sα2(α1 − 1) + (s− 1)α1(α2 − 1) + (1− 2s)α1α2] Π′JV (a)
+ (s+ s− 1 + 1− 2s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
α1α2Π
′′
JV (a) ≥ 0
Since the last term is null and Π
′
JV (a) > 0 the total derivative of ΠM is given
by the terms in square brackets which can be rewritten as
dΠM
ds
≥ 0⇔
sα2α1 − sα2 + sα1α2 − sα1 − α1α2 + α1 + α1α2 − 2sα1α2 ≥ 0
or
dΠM
ds
≥ 0⇔
sα1α2 + sα1α2 − 2sα1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−s(α1 + α2) + α1 + α1α2 − α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≥ 0
hence
dΠM
ds
≥ 0⇔ s ≤ α1
α1 + α2
which lead to the final optimal sharing scheme as stated in equation (11). Q.E.D.
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